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I.S.B. #6555
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #7259
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
TAYLOR JOHN KETLINSKI,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43859
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-1385
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Taylor John Ketlinski appeals from the district court’s Judgment of Conviction
and Commitment. Mr. Ketlinski was sentenced to a unified term of ten years, with two
years fixed, for his burglary conviction. He asserts that the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing him to an excessive sentence without giving proper weight and
consideration to the mitigating factors that exist in this case.
Statement of Facts & Course of Proceedings
On February 24, 2015, an Information was filed charging Mr. Ketlinski with
attempted strangulation, burglary, aggravated assault, and malicious injury to property.
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(R., pp.48-50.) Mr. Ketlinski entered not guilty pleas to each of the charges. (R., p.62.)
Following a trial, Mr. Ketlinski was found guilty of burglary and malicious injury to
property. (R., pp.116-120, 122-125, 127-129, 180-182.) The jury returned not guilty
verdicts for the attempted strangulation and aggravated assault charges. (R., pp.180182.)
At sentencing, the prosecution requested a unified sentence of ten years, with
four years fixed, for the burglary charge.

(Tr. 11/5/15, p.208, Ls.12-15.)

Defense

counsel recommended that the district court consider placing Mr. Ketlinski on probation,
with an underlying sentence of two years fixed and a “maximum indeterminate sentence
for observation purposes.” (Tr. 11/5/15, p.223, L.15 – p.224, L.2.) The district court
imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, for the burglary charge,
and 180 days for the malicious injury to property charge.

(R., pp.201-204.)

Mr. Ketlinski filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of
Conviction and Commitment. (R., pp.208-209.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. Ketlinski, a unified
sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, following his conviction for burglary?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Ketlinski, A Unified
Sentence Of Ten Years, With Two Years Fixed, Following His Conviction For Burglary
Mr. Ketlinski asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten
years, with two years fixed, is excessive.

Where a defendant contends that the

sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.’”

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Ketlinski does not allege that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse
of discretion, Mr. Ketlinski must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id. (citing State v. Broadhead,

120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho
385 (1992)).

The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:

(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting
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State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138 (2001)).
Mr. Ketlinski asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the
mitigating factors that exist in his case. Specifically, he asserts that the district court
failed to give proper consideration to his admitted substance abuse problem and desire
for treatment. Idaho courts have previously recognized that substance abuse and a
desire for treatment should be considered as a mitigating factor by the district court
when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982).
Mr. Ketlinski began using marijuana at the age of thirteen. (PSI, p.153.)1 He
used marijuana occasionally until his late teens when he began using daily.
(PSI, p.153.)

While in high school he began abusing pain medication. (PSI, p.153.)

He has also previously used methamphetamine and heroin.

(PSI, p.153.)

Most

recently, methamphetamine was his drug of choice. (PSI, p.169.) Mr. Ketlinski was
diagnosed as suffering from Amphetamine Abuse and Opioid Dependence with
Physiological Symptoms – Sustained Full Remission.

(PSI, pp.171, 181.)

It was

recommended that he participate in Level I Outpatient Treatment. (PSI, pp.171, 188.)
Idaho courts have previously recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the
trial court to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v.
State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Mr. Ketlinski has been diagnosed with Rule Out Mood Disorder, Rule Out - Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and Rule Out -Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder or Acute Stress Disorder.

(PSI, pp.3, 171, 181.)

It was recently

For ease of reference, the electronic file containing the Presentence Investigation
Report and attachments will be cited as “PSI” and referenced pages will correspond
with the electronic page numbers contained in this file.
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recommended that Mr. Ketlinski would “benefit from a psychiatric evaluation for
medication to address his agitated depression and the emotional volatility and impulsive
behaviors associated with his personality disorder. This evaluation could also rule out
PTSD.

He could benefit from short term programming using cognitive behavioral

principles emphasizing demonstration and modeling to address stress, anger and
impulse control problem.” (PSI, p.157.)
Furthermore, in State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme
Court noted that family and friend support were factors that should be considered in the
Court’s decision as to what is an appropriate sentence.

Id.

Mr. Ketlinski has the

support of his family. He has a “really good” relationship with his mother. (PSI, p.165.)
She wrote a letter detailing Mr. Ketlinski’s struggle with making mistakes and trying to
overcome prison mentality.

(PSI, p.149.)

She requested that the Court consider

rehabilitation and treatment for her son because he is not a lost cause. (PSI, p.149.)
Mr. Ketlinski’s father is still supportive of his son and is “hopeful his son will get ‘more
therapy,’ psychiatric treatment, and counseling ‘to keep him on the straight and narrow,’
and hopes that he can secure structured housing and participate in substance abuse
treatment.” (PSI, p.165.)
Additionally, Mr. Ketlinski’s victim, Ms. McElrea, offered a victim impact
statement that was supportive of Mr. Ketlinski:
Your Honor, I just want the Court to know that prior to what
happened, me and Taylor, he was my best friend, and I don’t want to see
his life lost in prison. I feel like if he goes back to the prison, they are
going to put him in administrative segregation where he won’t have an
opportunity to have classes or change. And I think if there was another
incentive or a different way that the Court could consider helping him, I
believe they should take that into consideration, because I forgive him and
I love him and I want to do well.
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(Tr. 11/5/15, p.207, Ls.6-17.)
Mr. Ketlinski has expressed his remorse for committing the instant offense. In
State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals reduced the
sentence imposed, “In light of Alberts’ expression of remorse for his conduct, his
recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive
attributes of his character.” Id. 121 Idaho at 209. Mr. Ketlinski has expressed his
remorse for committing the instant offense stating:
I’m so sorry the [landlord] had to deal with my anti-social behavior and
actions. I should have not let the victim get under my skin and I
understand that in order to continue to have a successful career and a
family. I need to bury everything I learned in prison. At the time[,] the only
thing I thought about was the present time even though my future is really
important to me.
(PSI, p.162.) In his comments to the district court he noted that, “I feel foolish for getting
into a fight and damaging somebody’s property. . . . I’m embarassed [sic] by my
decision and dissapointed [sic] by how many people this has affected and the way I was
so reckless to my future.” (PSI, p.170.)
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Ketlinski asserts that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts
that had the district court properly considered his substance abuse, desire for treatment,
mental health issues, family support, and remorse, it would have crafted a less severe
sentence that focused on his rehabilitation rather than incarceration.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Ketlinski respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it
deems appropriate.
DATED this 25th day of August, 2016.

_____________/s/___________________
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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TAYLOR JOHN KETLINSKI
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